Naturalism and AI alignment

post by Michele Campolo · 2021-04-24T16:20:02.900Z · EA · GW · 3 comments

Contents

  Introduction
  Part I
    and empirical evidence
    epistemic naturalism with AI
  Part II
    and alignment
    is instrumentally useful to general agents
    AGI systems might be difficult to describe in terms of a single fixed goal
    relative to other alignment approaches
  Conclusion
  Further readings and acknowledgements
None
3 comments

Posted also on the Alignment Forum [AF · GW].

Introduction

The problem of creating machines that behave ethically is inherently multidisciplinary; hence, it is often attacked with ideas coming from different fields, including subfields of ethics such as metaethics.

This post is made of two parts and its main focus is AI alignment, but it might be of interest also to philosophers. Part I shows how AI can contribute to metaethics, through empirical experiments that might settle some philosophical debates. Part II explains why the metaethical position known as naturalism could be crucial to the design of aligned AI.

The second part builds on ideas developed in the first one, so AI researchers might not want to entirely skip the first part.

Part I

Metaethics and empirical evidence

Readers from the AI field might not be familiar with metaethics, so I will briefly introduce the core concepts here. When two philosophers are discussing whether kids ought not to jump on their parents’ bed, the debate usually fits the domain of applied or normative ethics. Metaethics is instead concerned with second-order questions regarding morality, such as: “When people claim stealing is wrong, are they conveying their feelings, or are they stating something they believe to be true?” and “Is morality subjective or objective?”

The problem with these questions is that they risk being practically unsolvable. If the claim “morality is subjective” doesn’t imply any empirical observation which would be less likely under the claim “morality is objective”, and vice versa, the entire discussion reduces to a collection of irrefutable statements.

Some philosophers, such as Baras (2020), are actually comfortable with this situation: they see metaethics as a purely theoretical discussion that can be advanced, quite literally, without the need to get up from the armchair. These philosophers will probably assess the rest of Part I as irrelevant to their debates.

Many other philosophers (Goodwin and Darley, 2008) think that metaethical statements can be judged empirically. Concrete investigations aimed at clarifying metaethical discussions have been carried out in various fields, from neuroscience and developmental psychology to cross-cultural anthropology and primatology. As Joyce (2008) points out, it is also true that the results are sometimes misinterpreted, or difficult to use to support specific metaethical positions.

AI could provide empirical data significant to metaethics, especially if we take into account its future potential. Sooner or later, we will likely be able to design artificial agents that possess similar capabilities as humans. At that point, we could make various tests involving different sorts of AI agents that interact with a real or simulated environment, in order to better understand, for example, the origins of moral behaviour or what cognitive functions are involved during moral discourse and reasoning.

This method has a clear advantage with respect to other empirical investigations: if, after an experiment, the implications for a certain metaethical domain were still unclear, we could repeat the experiment with different parameters or different agents, observe new results and update our beliefs accordingly. This variability and repeatability of experiments is a feature unique to AI since empirical data in other fields are often strictly limited or require significant effort to be collected. 

Testing epistemic naturalism with AI

One metaethical position that may be tested using AI experiments is epistemic naturalism: specifically, the claim that what is right or wrong is knowable by observing the physical world, in a similar way to how facts in the natural and social sciences are known. Epistemic naturalism is testable via AI because, if there is a way of getting information about morality, plausibly an artificial agent will do it by interacting with conscious beings in the physical world—or an accurate representation of it, like a virtual environment. We don’t expect an AI to gain knowledge by resorting to non-natural entities, such as the god(s) of a religion or completely inexplicable intuitions.

The experiment to assess naturalism consists in the design and testing of Scientist AI: the artificial equivalent of a human researcher that applies the scientific method to develop accurate models of the world, such as theories of physics. Scientist AI doesn’t have to be extremely similar to a human: it could be made insusceptible to emotions and unaffected by human cognitive biases.

After Scientist AI spent some time gaining knowledge, we could check its internal states or knowledge base. If we found statements roughly comparable to “well-being is intrinsically valuable” or “pain is bad”, we should take these findings as evidence that moral facts can be known in the same way as scientific facts are known: a point in favour of epistemic naturalism. On the other hand, if we didn’t find anything resembling moral statements, or something comparable to aggregated human preferences at most, naturalism would lose credibility.

Of course, the given description of Scientist AI is sketchy and people will likely contest the obtained results. Here, the versatility of AI experiments comes into play: we could make slight changes to the agent design, repeat the experiment, and adjust our beliefs according to the newly observed data. Unless the results were highly mixed and hard to correlate with the different tested designs, we should reach a consensus, or at least more uniform opinions.

As a side note, I think the described procedure could help settle the debate around some of the claims made in the popular book The Moral Landscape (Harris, 2010).

Part II

Naturalism and alignment

Even if Scientist AI managed to gain some kind of moral knowledge, it might be hard for us to inspect the states of the agent to get useful information about human values. This would be the case, for example, if its internal structure consisted of a huge collection of parameters that was difficult to analyse with state-of-the-art interpretability techniques, and its outputs were apparently non-moral, e.g. computational models of chemistry.

However, there could be a way to bypass this problem. I claim that, if naturalism is correct, there is an agent that not only is able to gain moral knowledge by observing the physical world, but also acts according to such knowledge. This agent still resembles Scientist AI, but with the following differences:

For those who like thinking in terms of preferences rather than goals:

Here is a possibly useful analogy. In the same way as our behaviour after birth is mostly determined by innate drives, but as we grow up we become more self-aware and do what we believe to be important, so this agent starts with an initial drive for knowledge, but over time it changes its behaviour according to what it believes to be the rational thing to do, given the information it has about the world. Indeed, the hard part would be to formally define “act according to what you believe is important” in an unbiased way, without explicitly indicating any specific values or preferences (besides the initial ones about knowledge).

Now it should be easier to see the connection between metaethics and the problem of aligning AI with our values. If there were multiple unrebutted arguments against epistemic naturalism, we should doubt the possibility that agents like Scientist AI would come to know anything comparable to moral principles simply by applying the scientific method to gain information about the world. On the other hand, if naturalism became the most convincing metaethical position, as a consequence of being supported by multiple solid arguments, we should strongly consider it as an opportunity to design agents that are aligned not only with human values, but with all sentient life.

Unsurprisingly, philosophers are still debating: at the moment, no metaethical position is prevailing over the other ones, so it might be difficult to judge the “chance” that naturalism is the correct metaethical position. Depending on one’s background knowledge of philosophy and AI, the idea that rationality plays a role in reasoning about goals and can lead to disinterested (not game-theoretic or instrumental) altruism may seem plain wrong or highly speculative to some, and straightforward to others.

Leaving aside considerations related to the “likelihood” of naturalism, in the following I will describe some merits of this approach to AI alignment. 

Knowledge is instrumentally useful to general agents

If someone wants to go from Paris to Berlin, believing that Tokyo is in China won’t help, but won’t hurt either. On the other hand, if one is planning a long vacation across the globe, knowing that Tokyo is in fact in Japan could be useful.

The important point is: if an agent has to deal with a wide range of possible tasks, accurate world-models are instrumentally useful to that agent. Therefore, some AIs that are not designed to deal with a single narrow task may acquire a similar body of knowledge as Scientist AI. This is more relevant if Scientist AI ends up knowing something about our values.

The fact that good world-models are instrumentally useful to general agents should be kept in mind regardless of one’s own metaethical position, because it implies that certain agents will develop at least some models of human preferences, especially if these are “natural abstractions”: see Alignment By Default [AF · GW].

Future AGI systems might be difficult to describe in terms of a single fixed goal

Most current AI systems are narrow, designed to score well on a single measure or to carry out only a small range of tasks. However, it seems hard to predict what future AI will look like, given the lack of consensus in the field (Ford, 2018). Some cognitive architectures (Thórisson and Helgason, 2012) whose designs aim at autonomy and generality are already supposed to deal with multiple and possibly conflicting goals. Better models of these kinds of agents, like the one sketched at the beginning of part II, could help us understand the behaviour of general systems that are able to solve a wide range of problems and that update their goals when given new information.

Goal change is also related to concepts under the umbrella term “corrigibility”, so it is likely that studying the former will give us more information about the latter (and vice versa).

Advantages relative to other alignment approaches

Researchers with the goal of making AI safe work on various problems. Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (Gabriel, 2020) provides a taxonomy of what “AI could be designed to align with...”, that ranges from the more limited “...Instructions: the agent does what I instruct it to do” to the broader “...Values: the agent does what it morally ought to do, as defined by the individual or society”. Gabriel’s analysis is already detailed, so I will focus just on a few points.

First, it is unclear whether the narrower approaches should be prioritised. Assuming we completely solved the problem of making AI do what its instructor tells it to do, this could improve life quality in developed and democratic countries, but could also exacerbate already existing problems in countries under oppressive regimes. Moreover, there is significant overlap [EA · GW] between the narrower concepts of safety, and topics that mainstream AI research and software engineering regularly deal with, such as validity and verification (for some counterarguments, see the comments to the linked post).

Second, learning and aggregating human preferences leaves us with problems, such as how to make the procedure unbiased and what weight to give to other forms of sentient life. Then, even if we managed to obtain a widely accepted aggregation, we could still check the knowledge acquired by agents similar to Scientist AI: at worst, we won’t discover anything interesting, but we might also find useful information about morality—generated by an unbiased agent—to compare with the previously obtained aggregation of preferences.

Third, the naturalist approach, if fit in Gabriel’s classification as “...the agent does what it morally ought to do, as defined by the physical world” would aim even higher than the broadest and most desirable approach considered, the one based on values. In case the agent described at the beginning of part II was actually aligned, it would be hard to come up with a better solution to AI alignment, given the robust track record and objectivity of the scientific method.

Conclusion

On one hand, the design and testing of agents like Scientist AI could reduce the uncertainty of our beliefs regarding naturalism. On the other hand, naturalism itself might represent an opportunity to design aligned AI. At present, the chances that these ideas work could be difficult to estimate, but since the advantages are great, I think that completely neglecting this approach to AI alignment would be a mistake.

Further readings and acknowledgements

For a different take on the relation between metaethics and AI, see this paper.

Caspar Oesterheld (who considers himself a non-realist) has written about realism-inspired AI alignment.

This work was supported by CEEALAR.

Thanks to everyone who contributed to the ideas in this post. Conversations with Lance Bush and Caspar Oesterheld were especially helpful. Thanks also to Rhys Southan for editing.

3 comments

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comment by G Gordon Worley III (gworley3) · 2021-04-24T19:35:21.490Z · EA(p) · GW(p)

I do like the idea of being able to construct an experiment to test naturalism. I think it's mistaken in that I doubt there are any facts about what is right and wrong to be discovered, by observing the world or otherwise, but currently I and anyone else who wants to talk about metaethics is forced to rely primarily on argumentation. Being able to run an experiment using minds different from our own seems quite compelling to testing a variety of metaethical hypotheses.

comment by rhaps0dy · 2021-04-25T08:36:28.574Z · EA(p) · GW(p)

So, if I understand correctly, the central claim is that: if naturalism is true and we make a "Scientist AI" whose initial goal is to gain knowledge and which can change its goals, then the AI will be aligned. Is that accurate?

I think this is dangerously wrong. Even if the AI comes to gain perfect knowledge of morality for humans (either because naturalism is true, or because it reads about it on human-written books), there is no guarantee that it will then try to act as it is moral. Why does the orthogonality thesis not apply? Why would the AI not disregard morality and act in its self-interest, as many humans actually do?

(EDIT: from further reading, it seems that moral realism does reject the orthogonality thesis. To this I say: what about psychopaths?)

It is extremely implausible that an AI that can discover moral facts will be aligned by default, given the existence of so many humans that are simply not. That is still, assuming that moral realism (which I'm assuming is similar to naturalism) is true.

Replies from: Michele Campolo
comment by Michele Campolo · 2021-04-25T10:58:38.656Z · EA(p) · GW(p)

What you wrote about the central claim is more or less correct: I actually made only an existential claim about a single aligned agent, because the description I gave is sketchy and really far from the more precise algorithmic level of description. This single agent probably belongs to a class of other aligned agents, but it seems difficult to guess how large this class is.

That is also why I have not given a guarantee that all agents of a certain kind will be aligned.

Regarding the orthogonality thesis, you might find 1.2 in Bostrom's 2012 paper interesting. He writes that objective and intrinsically motivating moral facts need not undermine the orthogonality thesis, since he is using the term "intelligence" as "instrumental rationality". I add that there is also no guarantee that the orthogonality thesis is correct :)

About psychopaths and metaethics, I haven't spent a lot of time on that area of research. Like other empirical evidence, it doesn't seem easy to interpret.