Comment by jason-schukraft on EA Research Organizations Should Post Jobs on PhilJobs.org · 2019-05-04T17:24:37.463Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · EA · GW

Unfortunately, I don't have any hard data to back up that claim, just extensive anecdotal evidence from roughly seven years interacting with professional philosophers and philosophy graduate students. And my anecdotal evidence skews heavily toward the US, so I'm not in a position to even hazard a guess about the prevalence of philosophy PhDs with STEM backgrounds in continental Europe. Sorry!

EA Research Organizations Should Post Jobs on PhilJobs.org

2019-05-02T19:37:11.592Z · score: 41 (21 votes)
Comment by jason-schukraft on Detecting Morally Significant Pain in Nonhumans: Some Philosophical Difficulties · 2018-12-29T14:28:25.550Z · score: 6 (4 votes) · EA · GW

For the project, we've investigated plants, protists, and prokaryotes, all of which are capable of more interesting "behavior" than I would have anticipated. We began a preliminary investigation into a host of non-organic entities, but we discovered that an investigation of that sort is a bit more complicated than we expected. For many of the features we examined, it's a lot more difficult to ascertain whether a non-organic entity exhibits the feature. Also, many theory-neutral arguments for consciousness in various animal species rely on the species in question having an evolutionary background. It's of course totally possible that a non-organic entity is conscious, but the way you would argue that such an entity is conscious is often different in subtle but important ways from the way you would argue an organic entity is conscious. In future work we hope to examine this issue more thoroughly.

Comment by jason-schukraft on Detecting Morally Significant Pain in Nonhumans: Some Philosophical Difficulties · 2018-12-28T02:13:53.446Z · score: 8 (6 votes) · EA · GW

Ah, I see the worry more clearly now. I agree that, as best we can, we ought to examine not only the strict implicatures of what people write but also the background assumptions that motivate their reasoning. And I agree that at this stage of research, people's reasoning is going to be motivated less by hard evidence and more by pre-theoretic beliefs, although I don't really see a way to avoid this stage and jump straight into a more mature field.

For what it's worth, I personally think there's a significant chance that wild nature is overall positive and that invertebrates have negligible moral standing. But I also think there are plausible arguments on the other side, and if those plausible arguments turn out to be sound arguments, then the issue of invertebrate suffering (or wild animal suffering more generally) could be huge. The only way to get a better handle on the issue is to do more careful research.

Comment by jason-schukraft on Detecting Morally Significant Pain in Nonhumans: Some Philosophical Difficulties · 2018-12-26T21:43:00.617Z · score: 7 (4 votes) · EA · GW

It's true that it doesn't follow from the individuals of some class having moral weight that the overall weight of the class of individuals is going to be any particular size. The examples in the reflective equilibrium section should be read as illustrative, not as exemplifying any particular position. (I see, though, how those examples could be misinterpreted.) The basic idea is: IF your view leads you to believe that, say, plant-suffering is super important, you might want to compare your final theoretical judgments with the intuitions that got the project started. One way to avoid the result that plant suffering is super important is to adjust your moral weighting judgments. I intend the piece to be neutral with respect to views on moral weighting.

The word "pain" appears far more than "pleasure" in the piece, but this was a choice of convenience, not theory. (Again, though, I understand how this choice could be reasonably misconceived.) I intend the piece to be neutral with respect to first-order normative theory, including the question of classical vs negative utilitarianism. I don't intend anything I've written to commit me to a value-asymmetry between invertebrate pain and pleasure. Perhaps, though, framing is as important as strict implicature. If that's the case, I ought to write "pain and pleasure" instead of the shorter "pain."

As for second-order theories, it seems to me I'm implicitly assuming at least a high credence in moral realism rather than anti-realism. It's not really clear to me where I've assumed otherwise (though of course it's possible and I welcome examples from the piece). (Also, your comment doesn't commit you to my piece perpetuating this particular meme; just pieces of this general sort doing so, so maybe your comment was more general than I am taking it.)

Finally, I think it's true that there are some background assumptions about the relevant importance of wild-animal suffering at work in the piece. In (far) future posts, I hope to examine these assumptions more critically.

Comment by jason-schukraft on Detecting Morally Significant Pain in Nonhumans: Some Philosophical Difficulties · 2018-12-26T21:22:23.199Z · score: 4 (3 votes) · EA · GW

It's difficult to get even rough estimates of the number of individual plants in the world; for the purposes of the reflective equilibrium section, it suffices that there are far more plants than ants. In addition to plants, we are also investigating (in broad strokes) the extent to which prokaryotes do and don't exhibit the features traditionally taken to be relevant to assessing consciousness. Finally, as your diction suggests you already know, the phenomenon of sea squirts "eating their own brain" has sometimes been exaggerated in the literature. (In fact, adult sea squirts have perfectly good brains.)

Detecting Morally Significant Pain in Nonhumans: Some Philosophical Difficulties

2018-12-23T17:49:00.750Z · score: 48 (23 votes)